Regime measures in pawn protection

The protection of financial institutions requires particular attention for crime prevention and
criminal investigation experts. The reasons can be traced back to domestic and international
criminology situations and related tendencies. The norms regulating the operation of pawn
offices may even assist the perpetrator side besides including obligations and possibilities.
Pawn offices have a particular business system among financial institutions; their protection
requires individual considerations. I thought it more appropriate to review the formerly used
protection triangle and to develop, by using its components with a new approach, a model
named by me as a property protection rhomb. In this novel graphic, the weight of regime
measures is combined with the requirements of the Association of Hungarian Insurance
Companies (MABISZ) as regards pawn offices, which are classified differently compared to
the earlier triangle. On the basis thereof it can be stated that guidelines to determine the
necessity of devices and service providers as well as the place and role of background
activities are based on management decisions, resolutions, and strategies. Inappropriate
staffing conditions and the lack of training sessions and courses represent considerable risks
in protection. Over and above all this, let me state that there is no solution system to provide
a perfect method for fending off the innumerable sensitive surfaces, therefore there is no
perfect security, either. Inappropriately trained staff, improperly selected and operated
technical systems, erroneous principles and management decisions, frequently a lack of
communication, involve a marked sensitive surface: residual risk. In the course of
criminology and insurance company investigations I established that data were deficient in
some cases. This is due to the fact that there are no statistical data available until the
present time, and that some information is treated as a business secret. In my investigations
I came to the conclusion that the ”protection triangle” is deficient in content: it does not tackle
various protection areas (data protection, logistics protection, etc.); it does not take into
consideration the particular functionality of different objects, thereby making people accept a
fixed and inflexible system ideal. Deficiencies may provide opportunities for drawing false
conclusions. In my model, I also created and developed the flexibility properties of system
components (security elements) towards each other.